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October 2, 2015.1. INTRODUCTION
The Green Revolution in Asian countries showed that
reaching small farms through agricultural growth can be an
eﬀective pathway for poverty reduction (Evenson & Gollin,
2003; Hazell, Poulton, Wiggins, & Dorward, 2010). Accord-
ingly, the Agriculture-for-development strategy formulated by
the World Bank (2007) identiﬁes the smallholder farm sector
as the foundation for achieving the development of rural
economies. Still, smallholder agriculture is often subject to
ineﬃcient allocation of goods and services and other forms
of market failures. Smallholder agricultural producers are typ-
ically unable to capitalize on the beneﬁts of economies of scale
and have lower market access and bargaining power, espe-
cially in rural areas. Therefore, they face higher transaction
costs in most of non-labor transactions, such as the purchasing
of inputs, capital access, or the selling of output (Key,
Sadoulet, & De Janvry, 2000; Poulton, Dorward, & Kydd,
2010). The need to respond to these market barriers and
related government failures has led to the emergence of many
grassroots farmer-controlled organizations in developing
countries in the recent past (Arcand, 2002; Uphoﬀ, 1993;
Wanyama, 2008, chap. 14). Such collective action in the form
of rural producer organizations (RPOs) is widely seen as a way
of reducing the transaction costs of smallholders and of
improving their level of commercialization by creating link-
ages to high-value markets (Markelova, Meinzen-Dick,
Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009; Markelova & Mwangi, 2010;
Shiferaw, Hellin, & Muricho, 2011; Shiferaw, Obare, &
Muricho, 2008). Hence, over the past two decades govern-
ments and development agencies have put more attention in
the empowerment of rural farmers and communities through
collective action institutions, identifying them as important
partners in the implementation of agricultural development
programs (IFAD, 2001, 2010; World Bank, 2007). A lot of
hope nowadays is put on RPO with regard to their potential
for supporting agricultural growth, reducing poverty, provid-
ing access to services and markets, and creating employment
opportunities in rural areas. For instance, the United Nations
General Assembly declared 2012 as the International Year of572Cooperatives, with the theme ‘‘Cooperative Enterprises Build
a Better World”.
Empirical evidence, however, shows that in Sub-Saharan
Africa RPO have had mixed success (Akwabi-Ameyaw,
1997; Bernard, Collion, de Janvry, Rondot, & Sadoulet,
2008; Bernard & Taﬀesse, 2012; Fischer & Qaim, 2012;
Gabre-Madhin, 2001). Scientiﬁc explanations of this evidence
are scarce, since as yet little is known about the determinants
of RPO eﬀectiveness in developing countries and their ability
to provide beneﬁts for their members. The knowledge gap is
caused by high degrees of complexity and diversity of RPOs
and a lack of research evidence (Ragasa & Golan, 2014). This
creates a need for thorough and comprehensive studies of
RPO performance in order to better understand the function-
ing of RPOs and to design adequate measures for their sup-
port (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Ragasa & Golan, 2014).
This article contributes to the development of RPO-related
knowledge by presenting and analyzing the results of our
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cle are to assess the functioning of Ugandan RPOs and iden-
tify ways for their improvement. In this paper we seek to
investigate what are the speciﬁcs of the researched organiza-
tions, what are their structures and surrounding environments,
and what kind of services and beneﬁts they may provide to
their members. The goal of this study is to provide an under-
standing of what hinders the performance of RPOs in Sub-
Saharan Africa, what their underutilized potentials are and
what kind of development interventions could assist RPOs
in tapping into these potentials.
As our research methodology we applied a combination of
participatory research techniques, including participatory
mapping, public goods games, group discussions, and key
expert interviews. As a case study for participatory research,
we focused on organizations of Robusta coﬀee producers from
the central part of the Lake Victoria Crescent. Additionally, in
this article we provide general information about RPOs in
Uganda based on our estimations from household and RPO
surveys conducted in Uganda by IFPRI (2010) and based on
our analysis of focus group research conducted by Dejene-
Aredo, Hill, Keefe, Maruyama, and Viceisza (2009).
This paper provides detailed information on the functioning
of RPOs in Uganda in general and of RPOs dealing with mar-
keting of Robusta coﬀee in particular. It identiﬁes a niche for
development support in the strengthening of RPO and increas-
ing the welfare of their member farmers. To this end, we pro-
pose target areas for development interventions supporting
RPO and provide practical recommendations for their
implementation. The results communicated in this paper are,
therefore, valuable for donor organizations and governments,
as they could assist the design of the respective policies, pro-
grams, and projects.2. RESEARCH SETTING AND THE CASE STUDY
(a) Research project
This study was conducted as part of the international
research project, ‘‘Working together for market access:
Strengthening rural producer organizations in Sub-Saharan
Africa” funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economic
Cooperation (BMZ) and led by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI). The project was focused on the
analysis of the abilities of RPO in improving their members’
access to input and output markets. Its goal was to propose
viable measures that could support RPO and assess their
impacts by conducting ﬁeld and virtual (i.e., computer simula-
tion) experiments. The baseline project survey (IFPRI, 2010)
approached members and administrations of RPO. It was
accompanied by the participatory research reported on here,
which explored the functioning of RPOs and identiﬁed possi-
ble interventions for further implementation and testing in
experimental set-ups.
(b) RPO in Uganda
The ﬁrst organizations of agricultural producers were
formed in Uganda during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century
under the British colonial government and were traditionally
involved in the marketing of coﬀee and cotton (Kasozi,
2008; Masiga & Ruhweza, 2007; Mrema, 2008, chap. 5). Until
the market liberalization reforms undertaken by the Ugandan
government in 1990’s, these local cooperatives had been
mostly state-managed (Baﬀes, 2006; UCTF, 2013). Since then,the environment and functioning of farmer cooperatives has
changed considerably. On the one hand, the rapid liberaliza-
tion and consequent increase of market competition caused
excessive failures of state-aﬃliated cooperatives (Kasozi,
2008; Kwapong & Korugyendo, 2010; Mrema, 2008, chap.
5). On the other hand, more limited government inﬂuence in
the cooperative sector led to the emergence of member-
owned grassroots RPO in the country during the 2000’s
(Kwapong & Korugyendo, 2010; Mrema, 2008, chap. 5).
Thus, state-owned RPO were replaced by member-owned
RPO. These new RPOs are autonomous entities independent
of the government and intend to function as self-sustaining
proﬁt-generating businesses, unlike the RPOs from the past
aimed at securing the export commodity supply (Kwapong
& Korugyendo, 2010). Accordingly, the role of supporting
RPOs has been assumed by various NGOs.
As was conﬁrmed during our ﬁeld research, RPO in Uganda
are commonly formed around one or several agricultural com-
modities that they deal with (coﬀee, maize, sunﬂower etc.).
Usually, producers are organized on two levels: (i) primary
farmer organizations (locally called PO), unifying farmers
from the same village or parish; (ii) county or sub-county-
level associations, usually called depot committees (DC) or
area cooperative enterprises (ACE). Typically, a PO is respon-
sible for bulking the produce of individual farmers and coor-
dinating transport for delivering produce to the DC/ACE.
Collection of PO-gathered quantities, product transformation,
value addition, coordination of market sales, and input pro-
curement is organized at the level of the DC/ACE. Farmers,
however, may deliver the produce to the DC/ACE directly,
bypassing the ﬁrst-level organization. The DC/ACE is a
small-scale producer union consisting of several POs from
the same county or sub-county. It is usually not tied to a cer-
tain buyer and is able to bargain for better deals. Further, the
DC/ACE may be a member of a country or region-wide union
or federation, such as the National Union of Coﬀee Agribusi-
nesses and Farm Enterprises (NUCAFE), Uganda National
Farmers Federation (UNFFE), and others. These umbrella
organizations have advocacy and representative functions.
They serve for lobbying interests of agricultural producers,
further facilitating access to buyers, ﬁnancial services, and cer-
tiﬁcation schemes. Some umbrella organizations may have
established market connections with downstream trading part-
ners. In such a case, these organizations may also buy agricul-
tural commodities from the DC/ACE. In order to attain a
higher turnover and stimulate farmers to sell their produce
through the organization, the DC/ACE may oﬀer additional
services to its members. The services are typically associated
with agricultural extension and the marketing and transporta-
tion of member produce.
(c) Case study description
As mentioned in the previous section, present-day RPOs in
Uganda are relatively new. Hence, detailed and concrete infor-
mation about these organizations and their functioning has
been scarce up to now. A case study research strategy is a good
way to provide a ﬁrst comprehension of the topic, since it
allows for an in-depth analysis using multiple methods. We
used this strategy in order to close the existing knowledge gaps
related to RPO in Uganda. Our case study focuses on the RPO
called ‘‘Kibinge coﬀee farmers association” (Kibinge DC),
which is a sub-county-level farmer-owned organization from
Kibinge sub-county, Masaka district of Central Uganda, a tra-
ditional coﬀee-growing area. The organization engages in the
marketing of Robusta coﬀee, which is the main marketable
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Robusta coﬀee (Coﬀea canephora) (ICO, 2014).
Our focus on RPOs dealing with coﬀee marketing is not
accidental. For decades, coﬀee has been the most important
cash crop and main export product in Uganda. BOU (2013)
estimates that currently coﬀee comprises 15% of the total value
of Ugandan formal exports. According to recent data from
2012, Uganda is the second largest coﬀee producer in Africa
(after Ethiopia) and the 11th largest in the world
(FAOSTAT, 2014). There are approximately 500,000 coﬀee-
growing farms in Uganda (Baﬀes, 2006), growing about
310,000 hectares in 2012 with a yield of 186,000 tons of green
coﬀee. In total, the coﬀee production sector provides jobs for
around 3.5 million families (UCDA, 2013). In regions of
Uganda that are suitable for coﬀee growing, coﬀee sales con-
stitute a major source of income for 74% of households
(UCTF, 2010). This shows the signiﬁcance of revenues
obtained from cultivation of coﬀee for a signiﬁcant part of
the country’s rural population. Since coﬀee is a cash crop,
according to ICO (2014), 97% of the country’s coﬀee produc-
tion was exported in the agricultural year 2011–12. This coﬀee
was mostly grown by smallholder farmers (according to (Hill,
2010), 70% of coﬀee-growing households have less than
5 acres of land), making collective marketing through RPO
highly important for commercialization of coﬀee production.
Kibinge DC was founded in 1995 and registered as a coop-
erative in 2008. The DC is a member of NUCAFE, and it con-
solidates 46 village POs and 1,716 farming households (IFPRI,
2010). The DC oﬀers a wide range of services to its members,
such as training for agricultural practices, provision of plant-
ing material and management of transportation (more detailed
description of services can be found in Section 4(c)). The
group claims to be one of the ﬁrst in Uganda to engage in cof-
fee certiﬁcation (Dejene-Aredo et al., 2009). The lands occu-
pied by DC members lie in the central part of the Lake
Victoria Crescent in a peri-urban area on the elevation of
around 1250 m.a.s.l. The environmental and socio-economic
situation in this domain is characterized by favorable agro-
climatic conditions for crop cultivation, relatively good con-
nectedness to input and output markets, and a prevalence of
intensive coﬀee and banana (plantain) cultivation system
(Ruecker, Park, Ssali, & Pender, 2003). The climate in the area
allows for two crop-growing seasons. The main cash crop is
coﬀee and the main staple crops are plantain, maize, and
beans. The agricultural system is marked by low levels of tech-
nology use and is mainly based on manual labor.3. METHODS AND DATA
The methodology applied in our primary assessment of
RPOs in Uganda, the results of which we present in this paper,
consisted of four parts: (i) survey data analysis, (ii) participa-
tory mapping of RPO network, (iii) expert interviews and (iv)
public goods games with RPO members.
Since the information about contemporary RPOs in Uganda
that is available up-to-date, is scarce and scattered, obtaining
an in-depth picture of RPO functioning required a combina-
tion of research methods. Including qualitative participatory
methods (i.e., participatory mapping and expert interviews)
in our tool kit allowed gathering knowledge of the local stake-
holders such as RPO members, personnel, and related experts
(agricultural development and extension workers, researchers,
coﬀee buyers, government oﬃcials, etc). This knowledge pro-
vided ﬁrst-hand insights and multiple perspectives on the
research topic; hypotheses and study questions were directlyassessed with the help of stakeholders, who have a broad
implicit knowledge of the topic. A considerable advantage of
participatory methods lied in their ability to facilitate dialog
and information exchange with informants, and also to moti-
vate their interest and engagement in future stages of the
research. Furthermore, usage of participatory tools allowed
for adaptation of the research to the local context, which
was important, since we framed our research as a case study.
Since RPO networks and processes are complex, the qualita-
tive information, such as RPO member narratives, drawn
schemes and expert opinions, were helpful for understanding
RPOs.
RPO are entities emanating from collective action. There-
fore, it is interesting to investigate up to which extent individ-
ual RPO members are willing to contribute to the
organization. We did this by conducting public goods game
experiments in RPOs and analyzed the results of the games
with respect to RPO performance data.
In addition, in order to complement the research with quan-
titative information about RPOs in the country, we analyzed
the project’s RPO and household surveys. This allowed plac-
ing our case study within a broader country-level context.
Also, we used the survey data to conduct the selection of
RPOs for participatory research and to link the results of
our public goods games with the observed choices of RPO
members in coﬀee marketing.
The practical implementations of the applied methods and
data resources are discussed in the next parts of this section.
(a) RPO and household survey
In the study, we analyzed the project survey (IFPRI, 2010),
which was conducted in Uganda from March to April 2010 in
various districts of Uganda on three diﬀerent hierarchical
levels: (i) county/sub-county, (ii) village/parish and (iii) farm-
ing household. The respondents of the survey were board
members, administrative personnel, staﬀ, village leaders, and
regular members of RPO. On the county/sub-county level
the survey interviewed 21 administrations of various DC/
ACE. The majority of the sample DC/ACE (12 out of 21)
was dealing with Robusta coﬀee. Another four dealt with Ara-
bica coﬀee, four with maize, and one with plantains. For the
village/parish level, the survey selected 375 POs from the 21
DC/ACE, whose chairpersons were then interviewed. The
questionnaires for the PO and the DC/ACE were similar in
structure and their main topics were: leadership and member-
ship of the organization, services provided by the organiza-
tion, information on the value addition and collective sales,
as well as the decision-making within the organization. Two
regular members were then randomly selected from the PO
roster of each of the 375 POs visited. The households’ 750
selected members were interviewed using a household ques-
tionnaire. This questionnaire contained questions related to
household land use, crop and livestock production, labor allo-
cation, marketing of agricultural produce, household relation-
ships with RPO, and its use of RPO services.
(b) Net-Map
Our participatory research with RPO members started with
a collective mapping of the coﬀee marketing system. For this
purpose, we adapted the Net-Map Toolbox (Net-Map), a visu-
alized participatory method of systems and networks map-
ping. This interview-based tool was developed by Schiﬀer
(2007) and was successfully utilized by its creator in Ghana
and Ethiopia for research of diﬀerent stakeholder groups
NETWORKS OF RURAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS IN UGANDA 575(water user associations, education commission, ﬁshermen
community, etc.) (Schiﬀer, 2013; Schiﬀer & Hauck, 2010).
The output of interactive Net-Map sessions with stakeholders
is the map of socio-economic network where actors, their
links, and their roles are reﬂected. With slight extensions the
tool can be used for the mapping of processes (Raabe et al.,
2010). Instead of focusing on the static network, one can also
focus on the system’s dynamics and ask interviewees to depict
a particular process by identifying interactions between actors
of the mapped network over time. The Net-Map method was
applied in this way for the current research.
The Net-Map was conducted once with the administration
of Kibinge DC and 10 times with members of diﬀerent POs
belonging to the DC. We selected these POs from 36 POs of
Kibinge DC that were covered by the (IFPRI, 2010) survey.
From each of the selected 10 POs, ﬁve members were invited
to participate in one of the respective 10 Net-Map sessions.
In order to undertake a selection that can, on the one hand,
provide a good statistical representation of diﬀerent POs
and, on the other hand, meet requirements of data availability,
we applied a clustered sampling approach, using the statistical
software package (Stata) in the following sequence:
1. Exploratory factor analysis of IFPRI (2010) survey data
to select appropriate factors for sampling the PO.
2. Hierarchical cluster analysis and assignment of PO clus-
ters based on the selected factors.
3. Selection of POs for the group sessions according to (i)
their proximity to the cluster center (for choosing a typ-
ical PO in each cluster) and (ii) the weight of the cluster
in the survey sample.
4. PO with no information on PO sales in the IFPRI (2010)
survey were discarded from the selection and replaced
with next closest PO to the respective cluster center
(Data on sales were needed for the later analysis of pub-
lic goods games).
5. The PO chairperson and four random members from the
PO roster (from those with available information on cof-
fee sales in the survey) were invited to the participatory
session.
In practice the Net-Map sessions were implemented in the
following steps:
1. Introduction: PO members invited to a session were
brieﬂy introduced to the aims of the research. The goal
of the Net-Map was formulated to them as ‘‘describing
and understanding the process of coﬀee production
and marketing in Kibinge”. We then wrote the goal on
a blank A2 sheet of paper that was used for setting up
the map.
2. Description: PO members were asked to describe the
process of coﬀee production and marketing step-by-
step. Every time a new actor (e.g., farmer, trader, PO
chairman, etc.) was mentioned, the participants were
asked to write the actor’s name and draw a symbol for
it on a carton card. (Drawing was needed to control
for inclusion of illiterate respondents.) This card was
pinned to the map sheet. Each step of the process was
depicted as a link between actor cards. Every link was
chronologically numbered and described in the legend
on the side of the map. All process steps (i.e., map links)
were qualiﬁed as necessary or optional.
3. Re-assessment: After the map was completed, respon-
dents were asked to check whether certain actors or links
were still missing. The missing ones were then added to
the map. Also, the participants were asked about actorsthat are important for coﬀee production and the market-
ing process, but to whom the group does not have access
(e.g., extension service).
4. Assignment of importance ranks: After the description of
the process was ﬁnished, the participants attributed
importance ranks to the actors indicated on the map.
The subjective actor importance represented the inﬂu-
ence of particular actor on the success of the process
(in this case production and marketing of coﬀee). The
ranks were assigned on a one-to-ﬁve scale (by placing
dot stickers on actor cards). During assignment, the par-
ticipants were also asked to provide explanations for
why certain actors were relatively more important than
others.
5. Identiﬁcation of hot-spots: The participants were asked
to mark the possible complications and risks in coﬀee
production and marketing on the respective process
links and to explain them.
6. Follow-up group discussion: After the Net-Map, we
asked the participants to clarify certain aspects of the
map and some production and marketing issues in gen-
eral (e.g., intercropping, rate of fertilizer application,
etc.). The answers were written down on the side of
the map.
(c) Public goods games
The public goods game is a standard method of experimen-
tal economics. The results of the game show the willingness of
group members to contribute to a common pool of resources
of the group, reﬂecting the degree of trust among the mem-
bers. We conducted one public goods game within every
ﬁve-person group participating in the Net-Map (the selection
of participants was explained earlier in Section 3(b)). The
results of the games were then matched with the respective
PO and household survey data on coﬀee sales recorded by
IFPRI (2010).
When playing the game, participants used the rewards for
participation in the Net-Map that they had received from us.
The size of the reward was equal to 10,000 Ugandan Shillings 1
(ugx) per participant. We decided to apply monetary contribu-
tions and payoﬀs in public goods games in order to stimulate
thoughtful behavior of the players. Each game was set up as
follows:
 At the beginning of the game, all ﬁve participants
received envelopes containing 10,000 ugx in 1,000-ugx
notes.
 Every participant was given an option to contribute any
part of the reward to the common pool under the condi-
tion that sum of individual contributions would be mul-
tiplied by 1.5 and then evenly divided among all ﬁve
participants at the end of the game.
 Thus, individual payoﬀs (P) could be derived from indi-
vidual contributions (C) as:
Pn ¼ 10; 000 Cn þ
X5
i¼1
Ci  1:5
 !,
5
 Members were informed that their contributions would
remain secret from everybody except the researcher.
Members transferred their contributions to the common
pool in sealed envelopes provided to them. The inner side
of each envelope contained an identiﬁcation number of
the corresponding member, so we could then identify
contributions of particular members.
576 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(d) Interviews with key expert informants
Along working with RPOs, we approached experts from
various organizations related to RPOs dealing with Robusta
coﬀee for semi-structured discussion interviews. For each
interview a separate discussion outline was prepared. In order
to utilize the diﬀerent expert knowledge of respondents and
broaden the obtained insights, the topics covered and ques-
tions asked were respondent-speciﬁc. Table 1 contains infor-
mation about the discussion topics. In total, 21 key
informants were approached during 14 interview meetings.
Some were interviewed as a group, others individually. The
selection of experts for the key informant interviews was based
on research contacts and the availability of the informants.Figure 1. Time of RPO formation. Source: Own calculations, based on
IFPRI (2010).4. RESULTS
(a) RPO formation and membership
According to our analysis of IFPRI (2010) survey data (see
Figure 1), the vast majority of currently functioning RPOs
were established after 2000. According to Figure 2, most of
the present-day RPOs in Uganda are self-organized. Yet, from
IFPRI (2010) we estimated that 76% of RPOs received exter-
nal help during their establishment. Figure 3 shows the objec-
tives that were pursued when establishing the RPO. From the
ﬁgure it can be seen that every sampled RPO organized itself
in order to fulﬁll the requirement of a service provider or apex
organization in the value chain. Among the RPOs, a large
majority of 86% stated that value addition and collective mar-
keting were their primary objectives. Only about 5% of RPOs
were organized for collective savings.
The number of members in each DC/ACE varies signiﬁ-
cantly, from around 150 farmers in the smallest DC/ACE up
to around 3,000 farmers in the larger ones (Table 2). TheTable 1. Key informant inte
Topic
1 2 3 4
Casual labor
Certiﬁcation and quality incentives
Coﬀee pests and diseases
Coﬀee price formation and trends x x x x
Coﬀee-banana intercropping x
Cooperative savings
External development interventions
Factors determining coﬀee yield
Factors for RPO sustainability and success x
Farmer problems and constraints
Group decision-making and actions x x
Harvesting of coﬀee x x
Incentives to act as a group x
Information channels x
Institutional framework
Investments in new coﬀee plantations
Planting material for coﬀee
Production inputs x
RPO functionality and services x
RPO leadership
RPO problems and constraints x
Sales channels x x x x
Transportation x x
Source: Authors, based on the interviews with key informants.number of members in a given PO does not diﬀer much,
though, amounting to 10–40 members. The representation of
women and youth in a given RPO, however, is quite heteroge-
neous. On average, each sampled DC/ACE comprises 36%
female members and 25% young members (24 years of age
and younger), with 31% and 30% as medians, respectively.
One DC/ACE joins together 23 POs on average, and 17 POs
on median.
As mentioned above, value addition is one of the main
objectives declared by present-day RPOs. During the IFPRI
(2010) survey, regular farmer members of RPOs were asked
if membership in an RPO increased the price that farmersrviews. Matrix of topics
Interview number
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
x
x x x x
x x x
x x
x x x x
x x
x x x x x
x x x x
x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x
x x x
x
x x
x
x x x
x x x
x x x x x x
x x
x x x x x
x x x x x
Figure 2. Initiative to establish an RPO. Source: Own calculations, based
on IFPRI (2010).
NETWORKS OF RURAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS IN UGANDA 577received for their produce. Figure 4 presents the farmers’ opin-
ions recorded on the Likert scale. As the results from the ﬁgure
show, 71% of RPO members either agree or strongly agree
with the statement, ‘‘being a member of an RPO has increased
the price I receive for my goods”. An additional 12% slightlyFigure 3. Objectives of RPO establishment. Sourc
Table 2. RPO m
Members in DC/ACE Women in DC/ACE, % Y
Mean 1,006.6 36.4
Median 550 31.4
10th percentile 154.5 18.4
25th percentile 251.5 25.7
75th percentile 857.5 44.4
90th percentile 2,975 70
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010).agreed with the statement, while about 6% were neutral and
11% disagreed, slightly disagreed, or strongly disagreed.
(b) Structure of the RPO network
Kibinge DC is a formal organization with an open and vol-
untary membership. It is a cooperative of Robusta coﬀee
growers and deals only with this commodity. In order to be
a member of the DC, a farmer must possess at least two shares
of the DC worth 5,000 ugx each and pay annual membership
fees in the amount of 2,000 ugx. These fees are used for
administration salaries, maintenance of the DC oﬃce and
storage facilities, organization of member meetings and pay-
ment of electricity and telephone bills. The DC’s proﬁts are
usually spent either on dividends or small investments (sta-
tionery, oﬃce equipment). Important decisions (e.g., board
elections) are made at annual or special meetings by a vote
of members (every member has one vote, irrespective of the
number of shares he or she holds). Kibinge’s organizational
structure comprises a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, a secre-
tary, a treasurer, and an executive committee, all elected by the
farmers’ assembly. The executive committee includes an exec-
utive manager, a ﬁeld oﬃcer, and an accountant, whose sal-
aries are paid from the DC budget.
Figure 5 contains the output map of the Net-Map session
conducted with the DC administration. It displays the process
of coﬀee production and marketing in Kibinge sub-county and
characterizes the involvement of RPOs in the process. The
legend of the map is organized sequentially, describing thee: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010).
embership
outh (<24 yrs) in DC/ACE, % PO in DC/ACE Members in PO
25.3 23.3 33.8
29.8 17 24
8.3 9 12
10 12 16
36.6 27 30
40 35 37
Figure 4. Opinion of RPO members. Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010).
Figure 5. Kibinge DC. Network map. Source: Authors, based on the Net-Map results.
578 WORLD DEVELOPMENTprocess ﬂow from procurement of production inputs to ﬁnal
sales. The map also indicates importance of particular actors
and identiﬁes hot spots in the business system of the DC.The Net-Map sessions in the selected 10 primary POs pro-
duced maps similar to the one depicted in Figure 5, although
the drawn networks were not exactly the same. Some of the
Table 4. RPO services
Service Frequency Percent
Agricultural extension 20 95.2
Output bulking and marketing 19 90.5
Provision of market information 17 81
Paying cash on delivery 11 52.4
Output transportation 11 52.4
Input procurement 10 47.6
Processing 8 38.1
Savings accounts 7 33.3
Credit provision 5 23.8
Certiﬁcation 5 23.8
Warehouse receipt system 4 19
Output grading 3 14.3
Emergency funds 2 9.5
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010).
NETWORKS OF RURAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS IN UGANDA 579POs did not have certain actors in their networks (e.g., nurs-
eries or input providers), while other actors were linked to
additional nodes (e.g., development support or parish admin-
istration).
Table 3 lists actors who were reported by PO members to be
involved in the process of production and marketing of coﬀee.
This table reports how often speciﬁc actors were mentioned
during our Net-Map sessions. Also, the table contains the
mean of importance ranks (on a 1–5 scale, with 5 having the
highest importance) that were assigned to the mentioned
actors by PO members. Accordingly, the DC and the milling
facility have the highest importance, equaling a score of
almost 5. Such a high perceived importance (as explained by
Net-Map participants) was due to the large value addition that
can be achieved in coﬀee processing and collective marketing.
In other words, these speciﬁc actors are crucial for increasing
farmer proﬁts. In terms of importance, they are followed by
the PO members themselves, because PO members deﬁne the
coﬀee quantities that the DC sells and have collective control
over DC management. In addition, Table 3 shows that farmers
in some POs do not have access to such important determi-
nants of agricultural production as agrochemicals (linked in
six maps) and ﬁnancial services (linked in four maps).
(c) Services provided by RPO
The RPO network oﬀers a number of services to its member
farmers. In the IFPRI (2010) survey the interviewed DC/ACE
administrations were asked about the services provided by
their organization. The reported services are listed in Table 4.
As the table shows, the most common services of sample DC/
ACE are agricultural extension (95% of DC/ACE), output
bulking and marketing (91%), provision of market informa-
tion (81%), paying cash on delivery (52%), and output trans-
portations (52%).
In our case study, during the follow-up discussions (the last
stage of the Net-Map session) we asked the visited DC admin-
istration and PO members to describe the services that Kibinge
DC provides. As a result, we outline the following portfolio of
services that the DC currently provides to its members:Table 3. Actors in coﬀee production and marketing
Actor Mentions
(n = 10)
Mean
importance
DC 10 4.8
Farmers (PO members) 10 4.0
Local middlemen traders 10 2.6
DC-aﬃliated mill 10 4.8
Temporary labor 10 2.6
Transport for coﬀee 10 3.1
PO (leader) 9 3.8
DC-aﬃliated nurseries 8 3.6
PO (board) 8 3.9
Other local nurseries 7 2.7
Providers of agrochemicals 6 3.0
Providers of manure 5 3.8
Other farmers 5 2.0
Financial institutions 4 3.0
Promoter (parish administration) 3 3.3
Development support 2 3.0
Field oﬃcer 2 3.0
Source: Authors, based on the Net-Map results.
The values with mean importance  4 are highlighted in bold. Provision of planting material: The DC provides farmers
with coﬀee seedlings and cuttings produced in the local
nurseries. The DC staﬀ monitors the quality of the plant-
ing material.
 Seasonal credits: No-interest credits for productive pur-
poses are provided to member farmers at the beginning
of the growing season from DC operational capital.
Credit is approved on an individual basis, depending
on the history of borrower’s sales through the DC and
his/her expected coﬀee harvest.
 Market information: Farmers may request actual coﬀee
prices from the DC by telephone call.
 Transportation of farmers’ produce: The DC organizes a
pickup of dried coﬀee from PO members with a hired
truck. The pickup schedule depends on the quantities
that are ready for transportation at the PO.
 Milling: The DC organizes milling of dry coﬀee beans at a
local mill. The cost of milling is subtracted from the sales
price that farmers receive for hulled coﬀee beans sold.
 Group certiﬁcation: Through NUCAFE, the Kibinge DC
was linked to the ‘‘UTZ Certiﬁed” sustainability certiﬁ-
cation scheme. Several PO members underwent the initial
trainings and are currently able to sell their coﬀee under
‘‘UTZ Certiﬁed” label and, thus, increase the value of
their produce. The DC ﬁeld oﬃcer has to assure farmers
compliance with the code of conduct.
 Payment at the time of delivery: The DC occasionally
(subject to cash availability) provides payments for the
coﬀee on the day farmers deliver it to the DC (normally
the payment is postponed for up to one month). How-
ever, if enough operational capital is available, the DC
would be amenable to organizing ‘‘on the spot” pay-
ments for all DC – member transactions.
 Farmer rewards: In order to motivate the farmers to join
and sell their produce through it the DC occasionally pays
price premiums for large quantities delivered or hands out
various useful materials (e.g., drying tents) to its members.
(d) Problems and limitations of RPO
During the IFPRI (2010) survey campaign, managers of
DC/ACE were asked to list the three most important con-
straints that their DC/ACE was facing. We summarize the
outcomes of these self-assessments in Table 5. The most fre-
quently mentioned constraints were liquidity (reported by
57% of managers) and own capital (24%), transportation
(52%) and lack of storage capacity and packaging materials
(38%). There are also problems, which despite being rarely
mentioned, received high importance rankings, as their
Table 5. Constraints of RPO
Constraint Frequency Percent Mean ranka
Liquidity 12 57.1 1.9
Transportation 11 52.4 1.7
Lack of storage capacity and
packaging materials
8 38.1 1.6
Capital 5 23.8 1.8
Lack of processing facilities 3 14.3 2.3
Low quality of produce 3 14.3 2
Price uncertainty 2 9.5 2.5
Inability to oﬀer competitive
price
2 9.5 2
Lack of market information 2 9.5 1.5
Lack of production-related
information
1 4.8 3
Crop diseases 1 4.8 3
Competition with middlemen 1 4.8 3
Bad image of cooperatives from
the past
1 4.8 3
Low qualiﬁcation of personnel 1 4.8 2
Limited trust among members 1 4.8 1
Poor management skills 1 4.8 1
Problems with electricity supply 1 4.8 1
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010).
aRank 1 indicates the most important constraint; 2 – second most
important; 3 – third most important.
Table 6. Problems of RPO members in production and marketing of
Robusta coﬀee
Problem description Mentions
(n = 10)
Fertilizers 8
Fertilizers are not always aﬀordable (price) 7
No access to fertilizers 1
Planting material 8
DC seedlings/cuttings are not always aﬀordable (price) 3
Nurseries are not easily accessible (distance, price) 2
Cannot get suﬃcient seedlings/cuttings from DC 1
No capacity to have own nurseries 1
DC does not provide seedlings/cuttings at right time
(too late)
1
Sales through middlemen 6
Middlemen traders encourage bad practices and low
quality
2
Unfair prices from traders (farmers have no
bargaining power)
2
Traders cheat with weighing scales 1
Traders take advantage of farmers’ problems (urgent
cash needs)
1
Transport 5
Transport is expensive, prefer DC to have own vehicle 3
Price for DC transport is not fair 1
Transport is not very reliable, when the PO organizes
it for itself
1
Labor 2
Laborers are scarce and costly 1
Liquidity problems do not allow for the hiring
suﬃcient labor
1
Credits 2
High interest on microﬁnance credits 1
No link to long-term credits 1
Other issues 8
Coﬀee wilt disease 3
Coﬀee thefts 1
DC management does not treat members equally 1
Hard to attract other farmers to join RPO 1
Milling is expensive, prefer DC to own a mill 1
Weak linkage to large buyers 1
Source: Authors, based on the Net-Map results.
580 WORLD DEVELOPMENToccurrence might lead to notable decrease in the eﬃciency of
the RPO. Such constraints include mistrust among members,
poor management skills, and low access to market informa-
tion.
During the Net-Map sessions, members of primary-level
POs were asked about the problems that they faced in the pro-
duction and marketing of Robusta coﬀee. The mentioned
problems were marked on the collectively produced RPO net-
work maps. We summarize these self-reﬂected problems in
Table 6. The table shows that the frequently mentioned prob-
lems are associated with procurement of fertilizers (eight out
of 10 POs reported it as a problem), procurement of planting
material (eight POs), sales though middlemen (six POs), trans-
port (four POs) and coﬀee diseases (three POs).
Administrative staﬀ of the Kibinge DC indicated input and
output quality as a common problem in production and mar-
keting of coﬀee during their Net-Map session (output map in
Figure 5). They mentioned as well that attracting farmers to
sell their output through the DC is hard and farmers often
opt out of selling though the DC, instead selling to local mid-
dlemen. The access to large buyers from the top of the value
chain (i.e., foreign importers) was also referred to as a prob-
lem.
In the following, we describe in more detail the problems
and constraints that the coﬀee RPOs are facing in Uganda.
We synthesized the descriptions based on the respondent nar-
ratives collected during the Net-Map sessions and key infor-
mant interviews, as well as our own observations and
conclusions made after the discussions with RPO managers,
RPO member farmers, and the related experts.
(i) Input access
Table 6 shows that for a large portion of PO (eight out of
10) problems arise during the procurement of fertilizer and
seed. In the case of fertilizer, seven POs attributed the access
problem to the relatively high prices of fertilizer. Despite the
fact that nitrogen fertilization usually results in a steep yield
increase of Robusta coﬀee (Musoli, Hakiza, Birikunzira,Kibirige-Sebunya, & Kucel, 2001, chap. 25), fertilizers are
rarely applied by Ugandan coﬀee farmers. (We estimated from
IFPRI (2010) that mineral fertilizers were applied on only 17%
of the plots.) The relatively high fertilizer price in rural areas is
caused by the underdeveloped transportation and market
infrastructure in these areas. Therefore, when farmers procure
fertilizer on their own, the transaction and transportation
costs of fertilizer are often prohibitively high. In addition,
although the DC organizes the provision of planting material
to its members, its procurement was often listed as problem-
atic (eight out of 10 POs). This was mainly due to the prices
for seedlings or the long distance to nurseries (ﬁve POs), as
well as for the insuﬃcient amounts provided at the planting
period (two POs). Both planting material and fertilization
are among the major determinants of coﬀee yield (Musoli
et al., 2001, chap. 25), therefore we expect the limited access
to inputs to be a signiﬁcant production constraint. Self-
assessment results from Table 6 suggest that the DC is cur-
rently unable to fully satisfy its member needs with regard to
NETWORKS OF RURAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS IN UGANDA 581production inputs. Inability to purchase required amounts of
fertilizers and planting material is also closely related to the
ﬁnancial constraints of farming households (described in the
paragraph ‘‘Liquidity and access to capital” below).
(ii) Competition with middlemen
RPO members reported to generally prefer selling their pro-
duce through the DC, mainly because it is able to oﬀer higher
prices (because of extra value addition). However, in reality
RPOs are facing strong competition for member produce from
local middlemen and traders and, despite price incentives,
farmers often choose to sell through middlemen. Table 7
shows that just 52% of total Robusta coﬀee produced by
RPO members is actually sold through the RPO-channel,
which indicates rather tough competition with local traders.
The main reasons that cause RPO members to sell through
middlemen are:
 Lack of operational capital and low credit availability
forcing farmers to make informal future contracts with
middlemen in order to obtain cash before the harvesting
season starts.
 High time preference: Waiting for the RPO sales takes
time (up to several weeks), while traders can be accessed
immediately.
 Small trader margins: The prices that middlemen oﬀer
are highly competitive.
 Unexpected cash needs: Farmers are often forced to
make quick informal contracts with middlemen. Also,
farmers may have to sell coﬀee to traders that is not fully
dried (RPOs typically accept only properly dried coﬀee)
in order to get cash quickly in case of emergency. (Refers
to the response, ‘‘middlemen traders encourage bad qual-
ity,” in Table 6.)
(iii) Liquidity and access to capital
As discussed in the previous paragraph, farmers often sell to
middlemen instead of to RPO because of their immediate
ﬁnancial obligations. Informal credit from middlemen cannot
be fully substituted by credit from the DC, which only ﬁnance
input purchases (not consumption needs) and are generally
small and not easy to obtain. Immediate cash needs are neither
met by microﬁnance credit, which are also small and not
accessible to all farmers. Limited liquid assets of the DC, in
turn, do not allow providing larger credit to its members:
Table 5 shows that liquidity is the most frequently mentioned
RPO constraint. The limited liquidity of farming households
compels them to practice a low-input/low-output type of agri-
culture. (According to Van Asten, Wairegi, Mukasa, and
Uringi (2011), average yields of Robusta coﬀee in Uganda
are as low as 1.09 tons of green bean per hectare per year
for intercropped plantations and 1.25 for monocropping.)
(iv) Knowledge capacity
Key informants admitted the lack of farmer knowledge on
eﬀective fertilizer application. Therefore, due to improper fer-
tilizer choice and/or use, the attainable yield potential is not
fully tapped. Many farmers do not fully perceive the beneﬁts
of mineral fertilizer application, although in general coﬀee
responds well to mineral fertilizers and its use, when applied
correctly, usually pays oﬀ. Also, the absence of knowledge
of the soil properties of farmer plots results in suboptimal
fertilizer practices by farmers. Currently, there are only two
stations for soil analyses in the country (in Kawanda and
Makerere). Hence, the vast majority of the farmers are unable
to get information on their soils and reception of site-speciﬁc
fertilizer recommendations. In addition, the RPO membersindicated that their inability to cope with coﬀee wilt consti-
tutes a major problem. This problem is likely to have a signif-
icant adverse eﬀect on coﬀee production (Baﬀes, 2006).
(v) Primary-level leadership
Managers of the Kibinge DC and several key informants
informed us that PO leaders and village heads play a key role
in attracting farmers to the RPO marketing channel. They
promote RPO services at the village level and provide under-
standing of their beneﬁts for the farmers, with the result that
farmers sell more produce through the RPO-channel. This in
turn directly inﬂuences RPO proﬁts, because RPO beneﬁt
from increased quantities through ﬁxed cost degression and
higher bargaining power. However, since RPO bulked quan-
tity is the sum of production volumes of many primary POs
(46 in Kibinge case), the monetary gains for individual PO
leaders and village heads resulting from their eﬀorts are negli-
gible. Due to the opportunity cost of time and these low
returns, the leaders are not contributing much to the empow-
erment of the RPO network.
(vi) Transparency and information exchange
In our discussions with RPO members, we observed a lack
of understanding regarding the functionality of the DC on
the side of regular members, which might then lead to mis-
trust. The reason for this is the absence of clearly communicated
rules and transparency regarding the provision of DC services
and beneﬁts. For example, the DC provision of planting mate-
rial and seasonal credit does generally not follow any systematic
rules. The DC oﬃcers decide on every service request on their
own. Further, regular transportation and payment schedules
are absent. Therefore, RPO members cannot plan their cash
ﬂows and production in advance and this uncertainty leads to
rumors of the DC favoring certain farmers and discriminating
against others. According to farmer opinion, similar issues apply
to the ongoing certiﬁcation program that, as they stated, was
not well communicated to them. The beneﬁts of certiﬁcation
and ways to get their produce certiﬁed were unclear to most
of the interviewed PO members. Apparently, the existing com-
munication of the DC through member meetings and leaders
of POs is not eﬀective in informing farmers about the various
services that the RPO network provides.
(viii) Low physical capital of RPO and reluctance for long-term
investments
Since milling and transportation facilities are often used in
the DC cycle of operations, it might be proﬁtable for the
DC to own them. Such propositions were made by the DC
management and some POs (four out of 10 would prefer the
DC to own transport or mill). As the DC managers, however,
mentioned in our interviews RPO members are reluctant to
make long-term investments into the organization and the lar-
gest part of the DC proﬁts are redistributed among RPO mem-
bers. Therefore, up to date no signiﬁcant collective investment
projects took place in the DC. In fact, this is a recognized
problem of RPO and other cooperative ﬁrms in general
(Chibanda, Ortmann, & Lyne, 2009; Nilsson, 2001). It is
caused by the limited planning horizons of RPO members
(limited to the proximate duration of membership) and RPO
management (limited to the length of their elective terms).
(e) Outcomes of public good games
In the public goods games, the contributions of participated
individuals varied. As can be seen in Figure 6, PO members
decided to contribute between 20% and 90% of the received
Table 7. Sales of Robusta coﬀee
Coﬀee product Sales channel Total, %
To middlemen, % Through RPO, %
Wet coﬀee 0.5 0 0.5
Dried cherries
(kiboko)
46.9 46.3 93.2
Dehusked beans
(FAQ)
0.5 5.8 6.3
Total 47.9 52.1 100
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010).
The totals of individual product groups are in bold.
Table 8. Public goods games. Contributions by PO (in 1,000 ugx)
PO number Sum Mean Min Max Sd
1 19 3.8 2 6 1.6
2 30 6 5 8 1.4
3 27 5.4 4 7 1.1
4 30 6 5 7 1
5 24 4.8 3 6 1.1
6 27 5.4 4 8 1.5
7 21 4.2 3 5 0.8
8 17 3.4 2 9 3.1
9 26 5.2 3 8 1.8
10 32 6.4 3 8 2.1
Mean 25.3 5.1 3.4 7.2 1.6
Source: Authors, based on the results of public goods games.
582 WORLD DEVELOPMENTamount of cash into the common pool. Figure 6 also shows
that a 50% contribution was by far the most popular choice
among the participants. This ‘‘ﬁfty–ﬁfty” strategy was used
by 38% of the sample. Interestingly, the most frequently cho-
sen ‘‘ﬁfty–ﬁfty” strategy of public goods games correspond to
the choices that PO members made, when selling their coﬀee.
Table 7 shows that 52% of the coﬀee was sold through RPO
networks and 48% was sold to middlemen.
Table 8 indicates the contribution amounts across the vari-
ous POs. On average, each group collected in the common
pool 25,300 ugx from the distributed 50,000 ugx, which results
in a mean member contribution of 5,100 ugx.
The results of the public goods games were linked with the
statistics on coﬀee sales collected by the IFPRI (2010) house-
hold survey. Since only two members of each PO were
approached by the IFPRI (2010) survey and not every member
was willing and/or able to provide estimates about his or her
sales to middlemen, the data on member coﬀee production
were limited. Nevertheless, linking public goods game out-
comes with production and delivery data from the survey pro-
vided three types of data for subsequent analysis:
 Individual game contributions of the PO member and his
or her individual sales through the RPO-channel in abso-
lute terms (48 observations).
 Group contributions and group sales through the RPO
in absolute terms (‘‘group sales” refer to the sum of sales
by participants of the game, not all PO members) (10
observations).Figure 6. Public goods games. Individual contributions. Source: Own calcu Individual game contributions of the PO member and
individual sales through the RPO-channel as a share of
total coﬀee sales of the respective PO member (12
observations)
In order to reveal the correlations between game contribu-
tions and coﬀee sales, two non-parametric tests were applied,
namely Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau. Table 9 reports test
error probabilities for rejecting the null hypothesis of selected
variables x and y being statistically independent. Test results
in Table 9 show that both tests may reject the null hypothesis
at 5% signiﬁcance level in the case of testing group sales (y)
versus standard deviation of PO member contribution at the
group level (x). Hypothesis rejection at the 10% level could
be done by both tests in the case of group sales (y) versus range
of PO member contributions at the group level (x).
Having evaluated the model ﬁt (R-squared) using diﬀerent
combination of variable pairs, Table 9 shows that out of all
independent variables tested, ‘‘standard deviation of group
contribution” is the best descriptor of the dependent variable
‘‘group coﬀee delivery”. Our explanation is that this character-
istic of group contributions is less aﬀected by the normal ‘‘ﬁf
ty–ﬁfty” response of the game (displayed in Figure 4). Table 10
presents the estimated simple linear regression model. F-test
statistics of the model are signiﬁcant at the 5% level and both
the constant and intercept terms are also signiﬁcant at the 5%lations, based on the results of public goods games and IFPRI (2010).
NETWORKS OF RURAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS IN UGANDA 583level. The sign of the intercept term is negative, which suggests
that the amount of coﬀee sold through the RPO channel is
negatively related to the standard deviation of the group con-
tribution in public goods game. If we take the standard devi-
ation of member game contributions within a group as a proxy
for the diversity of member willingness to contribute to the
group capital, then we could say that this diversity within
the group negatively aﬀects the amount of coﬀee sold through
the group.
Table 9 shows no correlation between individual game con-
tributions (y) and the volume of individual sales through the
RPO-channel in absolute terms (x). This was probably
because the independent variable in this case does not consider
the total production of the member, unlike the case in which
the contribution is expressed in relative terms as a share of
production sold through the RPO. Unfortunately, due to the
lack of information in the survey, the calculation of this rela-
tive measure was possible only for a very small sample (12
observations). In this limited sample no correlations for this
variable were discovered.5. DISCUSSION
(a) Interpretation of results
Our results (Section 4(a)) show that since the early 2000’s a
signiﬁcant number of RPO were newly formed in Uganda.
Their main declared objectives are the provision or access to
services and the collective marketing of agricultural commodi-
ties. RPOs are oﬀering a wide range of services to their mem-
bers, from provision of market information to participation in
certiﬁcation programs. So far, RPOs have succeeded in
improving the commercialization of rural farmers by enabling
them to receive better sales prices due to the eﬀects of bulking
and value addition. However, RPOs experience diﬃculties in
the provision of additional services to members, particularly
in such services as input procurement, transportation, and
credit provision. The problems arise mainly due to limited liq-
uid and physical assets and a lack of commitment from RPO
members. It is not yet clear if in the near future RPOs will be
able to solve these problems on their own and improve the
quality of their services or if their services will remain underde-
veloped without further intervention.
Based on the insights on RPO that we gained from our
research in Uganda, we recommend the following of areas
where development interventions are likely to be eﬀective:
(i) Payment ‘‘on the spot”
Our discussions with key informants and RPO members
indicated the importance of timely payments of farmers. Sell-
ing through the RPO implies a certain delay in payment (due
to coordination of the collection of individual produce, pro-
duct transformation, and ﬁnancial operations), while farmers
are usually paid ‘‘on the spot” when selling to middlemen.
Given the high rates of time preference of farmers in Sub-
Saharan African countries (Holden, Shiferaw, & Wik, 1998),
even small time delays may signiﬁcantly discount the value
of future payments, thus discouraging farmers from using
the RPO for sales of their produce. Shortening the time that
farmers have to wait to receive payments from the RPO
may therefore increase their willingness to market their pro-
duce through the RPO, thereby increasing the RPO turnover
and, ﬁnally, allowing the RPO to beneﬁt from ﬁxed cost
degression and improved bargaining power. This would result
in the RPO being able to pay higher producer prices to itsmember farmers, leading to a higher share of local produce
being sold for better prices. Therefore, implementing producer
payments ‘‘on the spot,” which would require an increase in
RPO working capital, is expected to be beneﬁcial for both
the RPO itself and its members.
One way to achieve an increase of RPO working capital is to
negotiate pre-payment terms with coﬀee buyers. In this case,
the RPO selling ‘‘history” could be used to provide assurance
for the buyers. Formal contract agreements between buyers
and county-level RPO could also serve as assurance. Closer
integration of RPO with export chains is generally recom-
mended in the literature (Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Markelova
& Mwangi, 2010). Another option of increasing capital
endowment is taking credits from ﬁnancial organizations; here
umbrella organizations or related NGOs can act as facilita-
tors. The third option is improvement of eﬃciency of sales
cycles through employing a good product collection system,
motivating timely deliveries from members and organizing fre-
quent sales transactions with buyers. Researches of Ragasa
and Golan (2014) and Bernard et al. (2008) show that involve-
ment of external organizations (NGO, government agencies,
etc) in setting-up RPO management and operation models is
beneﬁcial for the RPO performance.
(ii) Improvement of information channels
In our case study we found out that RPO members lack an
understanding of the services that the RPO provides. Imper-
fect information and non-transparency of management deci-
sions tend to decrease members’ trust and their willingness
to participate in RPO.
Improvement of downward accountability by the introduc-
tion of more frequent and formal reporting could create addi-
tional trust and understanding in RPO, which would motivate
members to sell larger shares of produce through RPO and
make long-term contributions to the capital of RPO. In addi-
tion to annual meetings, information on RPO functionality
could be spread via post and/or SMS. Writing of formal asso-
ciation documents and regulations of RPO services and their
distribution among members could certainly improve the
awareness of members to RPO functions and the transparency
of the organization. The role of the outside support here lies in
improving the capacity of RPOs to develop their own account-
ability rules and methods, and not in imposing external rules
(Markelova et al., 2009).
(iii) Motivating leaders of primary RPO and village heads
In the RPOs of this case study, the important function of
village-level RPO leaders does not correspond with the remu-
neration they receive. This discrepancy consequently results in
low contribution and commitment from village-level leaders.
Still, as ﬁndings of Miiro, Mazur, & Matsiko, 2012 suggest,
the personal eﬀort of RPO leaders is decisive for the knowl-
edge transfer within RPOs in Uganda. Hence, the develop-
ment of a system that would motivate leaders might be
beneﬁcial for the RPO as a whole, given the discussed impor-
tance of these leaders. Such a motivation system could be
monetary or service-based (i.e., leaders get paid or get prefer-
ences in reception of RPO services).
(iv) Disseminating knowledge through RPO
The results of our study show that RPOs are quiet successful
in attracting farmers to their networks. Therefore, as previ-
ously suggested by Hazell (2005), RPO networks could be used
as vehicles for reaching smallholder farmers by agricultural
extension services and development agencies. In the situation
where farmers are already organized and interlinked under
Table 9. Tests for statistical dependency. Error probabilities
Variable y Variable x N obs Rho test Tau test
Individual delivery Individual game contribution 48 0.821 0.734
% of individual delivery in total sales Individual game contribution 12 0.392 0.477
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (mean) 10 0.443 0.589
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (max) 10 0.356 0.35
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (min) 10 0.247 0.302
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (sd) 10 0.054 0.049
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (range) 10 0.077 0.098
Source: Own calculations, based on the results of public goods games and IFPRI (2010).
The error probabilities < 0.1 are in bold.
Table 10. Simple linear model of coﬀee sales through the RPO-channel
Dependent Variable = Sum of game
participant sales through the RPO, kg of
green coﬀee
Coef. SE
Log10 (std. dev. of group contributions) 1,811.6** (770.2)
Constant 14,883.3** (5616.6)
F-test 5.53**
R-squared 0.4087
Number of observations 10
Source: Own calculations, based on the results of public goods games and
IFPRI (2010).
** Implies signiﬁcance at 5%-level.
584 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthe umbrellas of RPO, we can expect a faster dissemination of
knowledge and higher adoption rates of agricultural innova-
tions (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). Improving the knowledge
capacity of RPO members (e.g., about sustainable land man-
agement, technological innovations, quality standards, certiﬁ-
cation mechanisms, etc) and, therefore, improving farm
production eﬃciency would, in turn, lead to a stronger pro-
duction base of RPO.
(v) Access to inputs and ﬁnancial services
As was assessed by our study, poor access to planting mate-
rial, agrochemicals and ﬁnancial capital is one of the major
production constraints in the study area. In this respect, devel-
opment support might consider providing technical assistance
to RPOs in setting up facilities (e.g., nurseries, saving cooper-
atives, fertilizer depots, etc.) that improve access of RPO mem-
bers to required resources and services. Additionally, RPOs
can lower member costs of accessing physical and ﬁnancial
inputs by providing farmers with the required inputs before
season (as the case study RPO does). RPOs can use individual
sales records as an assurance of repayability of RPO members.
(The ways to achieve the required increase of RPO working
capital were previously discussed in the paragraph Payment
‘‘on the spot”.) The proposed measures of facilitating access
to inputs could, on the one hand, relax farmer production con-
straints (i.e., improve productivity) and, on the other hand,
make participation in RPO more attractive for farmers and
increase the amount of produce sold through RPO. Like
Poulton et al. (2010), we view RPO as a tool for horizontal
farmer coordination that can be used for creating and improv-
ing resource and service access linkages of smallholder
farmers.
The results of public good games preliminarily conﬁrm the
relationship between member willingness to contribute to the
common pool and the amount of produce they sell through
the RPO. Speciﬁcally, the game results show that the diversity
of member contributions (measured as standard deviation) isnegatively correlated with the amount of sales through RPO,
which means that the more heterogeneous the willingness to
contribute is among group members, the less is sold through
the group. The outcomes of the games indicate that the struc-
ture and internal composition of farmer groups inﬂuence their
performance as a group. However, this result is preliminary
and yet to be tested with a suﬃciently large sample. It would
be interesting to inspect the relationship between member con-
tributions in public goods games and RPO sales statistics, in
particular the relationship between individual game contribu-
tions and individual decision on which share of produce to sell
through the RPO, once more sample data are available.
(b) Limitations of the study
As our in-depth assessment of RPOs was mainly based on
one case study, its results might therefore be biased toward
this particular case. Hence, when generalizing from the results,
one has to consider the speciﬁcs of the RPO in this case study.
There are two features to be aware of: The ﬁrst is that coﬀee is
a high value-durable commodity. Organizations dealing with
other products, such as staple crops, perishable crops or dairy
and livestock products may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the
researched RPO (Markelova & Mwangi, 2010). The second
is that Kibinge has relatively good (for a rural area in Uganda)
market access and rural infrastructure. The situation in more
remote areas of the country (especially on the North) is prob-
ably diﬀerent. Thus, we consider our results most valid for
coﬀee-specialized RPO in development domains with rather
good market access and infrastructure (Ruecker et al., 2003).
Our Net-Map sessions and the IFPRI (2010) survey included
only current members of RPO, and former members or non-
members were not approached. Still, farmers who decided not
to join or leave the RPO may provide valuable insights into
the perceived problems and RPO beneﬁts. Moreover, the self-
assessment results are likely to be subject to a conﬁrmation bias
(i.e., members of RPO psychologically would like to think that
the membership is beneﬁcial for them). Also, in order to keep
the discussions within the reasonable time limits, we mostly
gathered information on the current state of established RPO.
But, as recent results of Ragasa and Golan (2014) suggest, the
foundation for the good performance of RPO could be already
laid at the stage of RPO formation. Thus, our practical recom-
mendations are more applicable for already established RPO,
and not for RPO in formation.
The social and political functions of RPO, for example polit-
ical empowerment, building social networks, or the organiza-
tion of community services, were not assessed in our case
study. Yet, these functions of RPO are important and well rec-
ognized (Bernard et al., 2008; Bosc et al., 2002), as they result
in empowerment of rural communities and improve rural
livelihoods.
NETWORKS OF RURAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS IN UGANDA 585In addition, the small sample size of the public goods games
might have undermined the statistical reliability and represen-
tativeness of the respective results. The results of the public
goods games are provided in this paper for preliminary testing
of the stated hypothesis, as well as for demonstration of the
developed methodological toolbox.
(c) Questions for future research
In this paper we identiﬁed the areas in which measures of
RPO support are likely to be beneﬁcial for the RPO and its
members. However, quantitative assessments are required in
order to design practical interventions that would also be eco-
nomically eﬃcient. Currently we are working on adapting the
bioeconomic simulation software MPMAS (Schreinemachers
& Berger, 2011) for simulating the functioning of RPOs in
Uganda. With this software we are conducting ex ante assess-
ments of various development interventions for RPO
(Latynskiy & Berger, 2015).
As yet, research eﬀorts in the ﬁeld of RPO are limited to case
studies (Ragasa & Golan, 2014). Depending on the local speci-
ﬁcs, these case studies (Bernard et al., 2008; Bernard &
Spielman, 2009; Bernard & Taﬀesse, 2012; Chibanda et al.,
2009; Shiferaw et al., 2008) present varied evidence and come
to diﬀerent conclusions. Therefore, a broader cross-country
analysis is needed to identify the political, legal and socioeco-
nomic environments in which RPOs are likely to succeed. Also,
studies have to reveal which of the many existing types of RPO
are the most eﬀective in diﬀerent environments. Moreover, the
appropriate mechanism for provision of support to RPO on a
large scale is yet to be found. More research is needed for the
evaluation of various types of institutional frameworks (public
and private) with regard to their ability to assist the formation,
functioning, and securing the sustainability of RPO.
It is also important to understand the trajectories that the
recently formed African RPOs may go through. Analyzing
histories of existing and defunct RPO will reveal problems
and barriers that the RPOs are facing at the various stages
of their organizational lifecycle (i.e., formation, establishment,
maturity, etc) and assess the impact of providing external
assistance at these stages.6. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The mix of various research methods (survey analysis, Net-
Map, group discussions, key informant interviews and public
goods games) applied in the described study highlighted diﬀer-
ent aspects of RPOs in Uganda and provided diﬀerent per-
spectives for the analysis. Combining several research
methods helped in understanding the functioning of RPOs
and the problems they face. Visualization of stakeholder-
provided information by means of collaborative mapping
facilitated stakeholder involvement and improved the quality
of the dialog between the respondents and the researchers.
The application of the Net-Map tool, which is inexpensive
and easy to use, was clearly beneﬁcial for the research.
The growing involvement of Ugandan farmers in agricul-
tural RPOs draws a clear perspective for using RPO as (i) tools
for improvement of farmer commercialization and access to
output markets, (ii) conduits for diﬀusion of good agricultural
practices and (iii) providers of resources for farms in rural
areas. RPOs are already making progress in these directions.
However, they are confronted with several limitations caused
by insuﬃcient capital endowment, weak information channels
inside the organization, problems with local leadership and
low member contributions. The role of development assistance
and extension services, therefore, lies in helping RPOs to ﬁnd
solutions to these problems. Appropriate mechanisms of sup-
port are yet to be found and researched.
In follow-up research, we use the results of this study to
parameterize bioeconomic simulation models of RPO
(Latynskiy & Berger, 2015). The study results inform this
modeling eﬀort in several ways: (i) the network maps help to
conceptualize the model, (ii) survey statistics, discussions with
RPO members and key informants provide some of the model
parameters and (iii) outlined intervention areas are considered
during the set-up of simulation experiments. Prospective mod-
eling results are expected to identify eﬀective and cost-eﬃcient
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